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Abstract 
Created in a post-crisis context, the Security Council is considered as the window through which United Nations’ 
activities are evaluated. As the main body in charge of maintaining international peace and security, the Council 
must be characterized by both effectiveness and legitimacy. Therefore, new requirements of the international scene 
have to be taken into account, including improving its representativeness. Legitimacy of the Council is 
permanently challenged due to, among others, its old composition, make it necessary to engage a reform in order 
to guarantee its effectiveness. This is the wish of almost all States and even the doctrine, but the institution is still 
facing the problem of its feasibility. It seems illusory to consider that a collective security system designed to 
guarantee security of a constantly changing world can be effective while remaining totally faithful to its very first 
conception.      
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1. Introduction 
The Security Council as the main organ of collective security system is at the heart of the unprecedented normative 
structure established by the United Nations Charter during the Second World War aftermath. Indeed, at the 
beginning, the Security Council was conceived and designed as responsibility and capacity organ whose primary 
responsibility is maintaining international peace and security according to Article 24 of the Charter. The Council 
is an exceptional body as far as its prerogatives are concerned, and has a special place in the institutional framework 
of collective security as provided by the Charter. The Council is much more than an actor since it is the last 
guarantor or even the institutional police in charge of bringing lost sheep back on the right path, namely, a peaceful 
cohabitation. 
In this respect, the Security Council’s role is vital due to its competence fragility on the one hand and its pre-
eminence concerning decisions involving the use of force at the international level on the other hand. At the 
structural level, the Council is based on the necessary agreement between the five permanent members when a 
threat to peace arises (Article 23(1) of the Charter). But after the short euphoria following its creation, the Security 
Council faced the advent of new issues not specifically provided by the Charter. Its legitimacy issue is currently a 
major concern, among many others, on the international scene and constitutes the showcase through which 
researchers, from various scientific backgrounds, assess or evaluate order effectiveness as provided by the United 
Nations Charter and even international laws. This issue shall primarily focus the attention of the lawyer in general 
and the internationalist especially as far as the need to improve both action and authority of this body are concerned. 
As concern since long time ago, the issue of reforming the Security Council and more precisely its 
composition falls within the general framework of that of the United Nations. This can therefore lead to the 
question of its opportunity, stated as, "Why shall we continue reflecting on an issue for which no attempt has been 
made since its first attempts? Is it not succumbing to a simple fashion trend, to alterglobalization rhetoric or 
technocratic chimeraism, to the pleasure of paper architecture and imaginary cities? "(Hubert Védrine, 2004, p. 
125). Through these multiple questions, the author was already revealing the relatively original nature of an 
analysis based on United Nations reform in general and that of the Security Council in parallel. But it is still 
relevant considering conceptual limitations and functional failures observed since 1945 as well as the need for this 
body to respond to ever-increasing demands of international society. The gap or the obvious gap between San 
Francisco ideal and subsequent practice of the Council call for, beyond innovation thereto related, a real need for 
"conventionalization". 
This imperative is related to the impact of time on the institution. Indeed, "there is no unchallengeable 
constitution. Any constitution must adapt to the changing conditions of the Society it governs; whether national or 
international, any constitution must be revised», (Emile Giraud, 1956, p. 341). Its topicality is thus linked to the 
constancy of expectations and the permanence of certain difficulties. This need for reform is seen as the solution 
or even the precondition to compensate for the gap that is gradually being created between the 1945 
Charter and the current world. However, the leap towards modernity goes far beyond a simple wish motivated 
by a legally pre-established procedural framework to incorporate considerations that escape the internationalist 
lawyer. Indeed, it seems illusory to consider that a collective security system designed to guarantee the security of 
a constantly changing world can be effective if it remains totally faithful to its original conception. Indeed, while 
"it is obvious that a strengthening international community needs a forum for dialogue and decision-making to 
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resolve community problems" (Yves Sandoz, 2003, p. 326), it is equally important that such a platform be covered 
by a certain legitimacy that consolidates its authority. 
Legitimacy of the Security Council is essentially based on the United Nations Charter, which establishes its 
competence and provide necessary powers as well as prerogatives for exercising its functions. Therefore, as a 
constitutive charter, it can organise the process or conditions and modalities of any provisions’ modification. There 
is therefore no specific procedure for Security Council reform other than that defined by the Charter. The on-going 
challenge to legitimacy of the Council due to a number of cumulative factors underlies the need for a reform in 
order to ensure its effectiveness. If it is the wish of almost all States and even the doctrine, it raises the issue of its 
feasibility. It is rather the question of its enlargement that has not been unanimously accepted since the only reform 
in 1965 because of the formalism it requires. So how can we understand this difficulty in moving from intention 
to action? This interrogation once again highlights the famous dialectic between law and politics. In practical terms, 
this means that the legal framework is favourable to enlargement and early implementation or operationalization. 
 
2. Malleability of the legal framework for Security Council’s enlargement 
Exercising secondary constituent power is fundamentally governed by the Charter, which sets out procedure for 
exercising it. An analysis of the said legal framework makes it possible to affirm the malleability of the substantial 
reform framework. Any reform of the Security Council requires amendment and review of United Nations Charter 
provisions. While the need to review Security Council composition is not in dispute in principle, it is important to 
know what the Charter allows and what it does not. The reform of a system is related to its standards (decisions) 
and organs. It is therefore important to analyse here the "constitutional" organization of Security Council reform. 
Based on the analysis, it appears that there is some flexibility in this legal framework, which fluctuates between 
restrictive clauses absence and a formal modification procedure. 
 
2.1 The absence of unchangeable clauses as a guarantee for an expansion of the Security Council 
Generally, it is noticed that the mode of reviewing constitutions of States and even of some international 
organizations constitutive charters set substantial limits to any possible modification. The main purpose is to 
exempt certain provisions from any initiative or reform attempt. Constitutions themselves set limits to their 
revision. These limits are either material or temporal. It appears that failure to exempt certain provisions of the 
Charter from possible amendment is a clear indication of this constitutive treaty as compare to domestic law to 
which it is frequently assimilated (Sandra Szurek, 2005 p. 36) and even from some international organizations. 
2.1.1 Demarcation of the Charter as compare to domestic law on constitutional review 
Procedure for revising constitution is not uniform in all States and it is the proof of States’ sovereignty, if not the 
main one. As such, it is freely elaborated by each State. Constitutional review principle is preserved in all modern 
constitutions. Depending on the flexibility of the revision procedure, the flexible constitution traditionally 
contrasted with the so-called rigid one. It therefore presupposes the existence of a written constitution. Beyond 
certain traditional theoretical considerations, each State defines the legal framework for the revision of the 
constitution by providing, among other things, for material limits, a kind of "intransgressible norms" or rules that 
are not subject to any revision. 
In an analysis of constitutional provisions of some States, K. Gözler draws up a non- exhaustive list of various 
intangibility clauses envisaged. Thus, for the author, these insubstantial reform provisions are related to: 
prohibition to review the republican form of government, the monarchical form of the State, the federal structure 
of the State, the unitary character of the State, prohibition to review ideological foundations of the State, human 
rights, integrity of the territory of the State (K. Gözler, 1997). Thus, the statement according to which "a good 
Constitution is not just a set of rules and institutions. It must be a living body able to adapt to transformations of 
the society it governs" (J-L. Quermonne, 2004) is therefore relevant in principle but subject to adaptation according 
to each context, (Jean-Louis Atangana-Amougou, 2007, p. 583). 
Considering the relevance of States that have adopted, it is clear that prohibition on reforming the republican 
form of government seems to be one of irreconcilable clauses mostly considered by States. Moreover, as a 
sovereign prerogative, each State freely defines the scope of these intangible clauses. They may be extensive as in 
Germany and Portugal (see Articles 1 and 20 of the German Constitution and Article 288 of the Portuguese 
Constitution). This need to make sacred some constitutional law provisions sometimes goes beyond the substantial 
framework to include temporal limitations (the French Constitution of 1791); constitutions prohibit any revision 
before a certain period of time. This internal state practice may aim to guarantee some stability in state legal order 
fundamentals. In this context, there would be final achievements that are not subject to requirements of time 
evolution. 
Still concerning derived constituent power limitation, some constitutions prohibit any revision in some 
circumstances. Thus, some constitutions prohibit their revision when the integrity of the territory is compromised 
as well as during the interim presidency of the republic (the 1958 French Constitution (art. 89, para. 4). A similar 
prohibition is also adopted by some African States (Mali, art. 76; Côte d'Ivoire, art. 73; Gabon, art. 84; Togo, art. 
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53); some monarchical constitutions prohibit the revision of the constitution during regency periods (art. 197 of 
the new Belgian Constitution of 17 February 1994) and revision prohibition of the constitution during exceptional 
states (article 289 of the Portuguese Constitution, art. 196 of the new Belgian Constitution of 17 February 1994). 
The power to review constitutions therefore remains, in general, limited and subject to constitutional requirements 
of each State. This gives rise to a kind of restrictive custom in terms of amending constitutions, since it seems rare 
to find a constitution that authorises, in absolute terms, amendment of all its fundamental law provisions. In 
international law, the legal regime for amending international conventions is relatively flexible and open as 
compared to that of domestic law. 
2.1.2 Demarcation of the Charter as compared to constitutive treaties of other international organizations 
In general, it is the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties which sets out general rules of 
customary origin governing the modification of treaties in international law (articles 39 to 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969). However, these measures have an indicative and 
supplementary function as the parties and therefore agreements that freely organise procedures and define 
procedure for amending their content by including revision clauses in practice. In determining how they should be 
revised, some organizational constitutions are fundamentally similar to the model for revising national 
constitutions, while others differ in some respects. 
Material limitations hypothesis stated by general law is explicitly enshrined in some multilateral treaties. 
Thus, Article 155§2 of the Montego Bay Convention provides that: "The Review Conference shall ensure that 
common heritage of humanity principle, international regime for its equitable exploitation for the benefit of all 
countries, in particular developing States, and existence of an authority in charge of organizing, conducting and 
controlling activities in the area are maintained. It shall also ensure that some principles indicated here are 
maintained with respect to exclusion of any claim and exercise of sovereignty over any part of the Area, (...). The 
subjects thus listed are excluded from any revision procedure. It therefore seems that the regulations relating to 
these areas have been in force for life and therefore not subject to any change. The UN Charter, for its part, does 
not subscribe to this restrictive practice of the power of modification. 
The Charter of the World Organization does not provide fixed provisions, in other words, provisions are 
exempted from any attempt to modify their content or legal effect. Nevertheless, absence of an exception to 
amendment procedure provided for in Article 108 of the Charter means that "no provision, even fundamental one, 
shall escape the virtual scope of amendments" (J. Dehaussy, 2005, p. 2194). It is in line with the idea that 
"adaptation of treaty relations is a political necessity, and desire to maintain existing rules as they stand may mask 
the need to preserve undue privileges and advantages". Revision clauses contained in Articles 108 and 109 are 
basically concerned with defining the procedure and determining modalities for adoption, ratification and entry 
into force of any amendments to Constituent Treaty. Consequently, in absence of provisions exempting articles 
from any amendment, it appears that the whole of this normative mechanism may be amended (; ICJ, Case on 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Reports, 1986, p. 45). Legal framework malleability 
for revision thus established is extended beyond substantive field to the procedural aspect. 
 
2.2 An enlargement subject to a relatively rigid procedure 
Analysing the Security Council legal framework reform is undoubtedly about the legal framework for amending 
the UN Charter. Indeed, any change in the structure and functioning of the Security Council necessarily requires 
an amendment and revision of the constituent treaty. These legal precautions are for both the preparatory phase 
and the final phase of this process, which is ratification. 
2.2.1 Preparatory Phase Conditions: adoption of the enlargement project  
The general legal framework for revising the Charter provided by Articles 108 and 109. The start-up phase can be 
described as the preparatory or "pre-constituent" phase. As for this study, the latter corresponds to amendment 
initiative and draft amendment preparation. 
As far as the amendment initiative is concerned, it is dual insofar as it may be made by two separate bodies: 
either by the General Assembly or by a Conference convened for that purpose. However, nothing is said about 
elaboration of the text submitted later. Competence sharing between the General Assembly and the Conference 
results from a distinction made by the Charter between amendment and revision. By this practice, the Charter 
differs from the general rule on the amendment of the constituent instruments of international organizations. 
Generally speaking, in international law, a convention adoption is made by a more or less qualified majority, 
in absence of acceptance by all, according to the voting rule giving each State one vote. These procedures for 
adopting draft amendments to a treaty may be defined by the internal provisions of each convention and thus vary 
from one convention to another. From the outset, practice shows that, with regard to the adoption of the amendment, 
the unanimity rule is almost exclusively waived. The latter now only applies to treaties concluded between a small 
number of States (Article 48(1) of the TEU applicable to all Community treaties or Protocol No 11 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights). In addition, some multilateral treaties provide for rather atypical ways of adopting 
possible amendments (Article 313 § 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). 
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In fact, States vote constitutes, considering a constant practice, the main method of adopting amendments to 
a treaty. And as a general rule, it is the majority principle that serves as the applicable standard and the organs of 
international organizations play a leading role in this regard. Thus, with regard to the Charter, the majority required 
for the adoption of any amendments is "two thirds of the members of the General Assembly" (Article 108). With 
regard to the revision, Article 109 refers to "any amendment to this Charter recommended by the Conference by a 
two-thirds majority". The cumulative analysis of these provisions shows that amendments made in accordance 
with article 108 require the intervention of the General Assembly only, while the second means of revision is with 
the approval of the Security Council. 
Indeed, there are no fundamental major differences between the procedure under Articles 108 and 109. In 
practice, the co-owners of the derived constituent power have the same composition and cannot therefore vote 
under different conditions. In addition, the use of traditional treaty adoption law as enshrined in the Vienna 
Convention may constitute an additional source of analysis. Indeed, the latter provides that " text adoption of a 
treaty at an international conference shall be effected by a two-thirds majority of the States present and voting, 
unless those States decide by the same majority, a different rule" (Article 9, § 2 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969). This rule applies equally to the adoption of a new treaty and to an amendment 
to a pre-existing treaty. However, the General Assembly will definitively dispel all ambiguities and procedural 
uncertainties that are the source of many controversies. 
In a resolution of 23 November 1998, the General Assembly expressed its determination to "adopt no 
resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security 
Council... without a vote of at least two thirds of the members". This is two thirds of the members, which is 
obviously even more binding than the two thirds majority of those present and voting, provided for important 
matters under Rule 18. The scope of this provision seems to be limited to the specific issue of Security Council 
reform. This can be justified by the sensitivity of this issue and, above all, by the real implication, on the 
functioning of the Organization, of any modification of the Security Council. 
Moreover, a draft amendment adoption is not subject to a favourable vote by all permanent members.  Indeed, 
the abstention or negative vote of one of the permanent members cannot prevent its adoption as soon as the 
necessary quota of votes is reached. Thus, when the 1963 draft reform of the Security Council was adopted, only 
China voted for the rest of the permanent members who either abstained or voted against. But the number of 
positive votes (96 votes) allowed the project to be adopted and the ratification phase to begin. This did not prevent 
the ratification of this text by all permanent members. In view of the above, it seems excessive to consider the 
requirement for ratification of the draft amendment by all members as one of the obstacles to the implementation 
of Council reform. This is all the more significant as no reform project of this body has since then reached the 
stage of ratification and has been blocked due to a negative vote by one of the permanent members. The 
requirement of unanimity of the permanent members is not a systematic limitation. Through this approach, the 
Charter tends to emphasize the transitional and not final nature of adoption and its status as a step in a process 
culminating in ratification. 
2.2.2 The final stage of the Charter amendment procedure: ratification and its legal impacts 
Ratification is the legally decisive phase that transforms the draft treaty into a final and written commitment. 
Theoretically, the treaty is considered to be hybrid because it is simultaneously governed by domestic and 
international legal systems, especially in terms of its drafting or conclusion. Therefore, the ratification of a treaty 
at the international level, by which the State indicates to the international community its intention to respect the 
terms of the treaty, should not be confused with the ratification at the national level, which a State must sometimes 
proceed to, in accordance with its constitutional provisions, before expressing its consent to be bound at the 
international level. 
Procedure for amending the Charter, as well as that required for its institution, has not set a deadline for States 
to send their instruments of ratification to the depositary. However, this silence cannot be interpreted as excluding 
or prohibiting such a possibility. Thus, much more than a hypothesis, the possibility for the General Assembly to 
subject ratification to a time limit was a reality in the context of the amendments to articles 23, 27 and 61 of the 
Charter made by resolutions 1991 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963. This non-traditional practice should, in its 
development, which is certainly always expected, take into account a number of factors, in particular the diversity 
and scope of the constitutional procedures for ratification. While ratification is the final step in the amendment 
procedure, it is subject, under the Charter, to additional conditions that make it difficult its entry into force and 
undermine the amendment procedure. 
The entry into force of any amendments to the Charter is the last legal modality that definitively regulates the 
formal attachment of Member States to the "new" convention. As such, it is subject to some classic procedural 
requirements for its implementation. 
Broadly speaking, an amendment enters into force according to provisions of the Treaty relating to 
amendments, for example: upon expiry of a certain period after submitting a certain number or percentage of 
ratification instruments, acceptance, etc.; or within a certain period after its publication, provided that none of the 
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parties to the Treaty objects (Article 20(4) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1997). This principle is for both to the original text and to any amendments that may be made to 
it. To this end, the Charter provides that any amendment shall enter into force "when it has been ratified, according 
to their respective constitutional processes, by two thirds of United Nations Members, including all Security 
Council permanent members". In accordance with this provision, it appears that two cumulative conditions are 
required for an amendment to have legal effects on Member States. This concerns adopted text ratification by a 
two-thirds majority of members, but also and above all unanimous vote of the five permanent members. Indeed, 
by a discretionary refusal of ratification, each of the five great Powers can prevent the entry into force of any 
amendment to the Charter (Paul De Visscher, 1966-2). 
Failure to ratify, a permanent member can impact the work done, perhaps in its absence, from the preparatory 
phase to reach agreement. Moreover, its assistance is not required for the adoption of text submitted for ratification, 
if any. Thus, when amendments to Articles 23 and 27 were adopted, increasing the number of non-permanent 
members of the Security Council from six to ten, France and the USSR voted against them, while the United 
Kingdom and the United States abstained. However, this "negative" vote of the permanent members did not 
prevent the adoption of the draft resolution to amend the Charter. However, they had all ratified these amendments, 
which entered into force on 31 August 1965, date of their ratification by the United States. The Charter has opted 
for a more binding and less flexible approach. Practice will be more informative if new amendments are adopted 
in the future, especially since there has been a constant need to reform World Organization’s Constitutive Charter 
since adoption of first ones. 
 
3. A politically unstable implementation 
Many attempts to reform the Organization, as evidenced by various reports, make it possible to consider, on an 
indicative basis, the extent of disagreement areas.  P. Tavernier refers to it as "Loch Ness monster" (P. Tavernier, 
2005). Security Council inconsistent authority when facing threats flexibility makes it imperative and timeless this 
need for change (D. Colard, 2000). Convergence of views on Security Council democratization by improving its 
representativeness attests the permanent and inevitable nature of this issue in international law. However, this is a 
new requirement for this body, which was originally built around other priorities. Indeed, as J. P. Colin points out, 
"When United Nations founders entrusted the Security Council with maintaining international peace and security 
its primary responsibility..., it was not intended to become a purely representative entity, it was intended to become 
a responsible body, a decision maker and actor" (J. P. Colin, 1991). The Security Council has therefore been 
established based on logic of responsibility and capacity, but States now consider that its authority requires better 
representation (Alexandra Novosseloff, 2006). In other words, much more than a simple increase in the number 
of board members, the problem is fundamentally related to the veto right that is the main issue. 
 
3.1 Flowering of proposals as obstacle to the Security Council’s enlargement 
Improving the way this body is composed is, almost unanimously accepted by doctrine, States and various reports 
thereto related. However, this agreement on improving the Council’s composition has never occurred due to 
persistent disagreement on the exact number of members who should legitimately compose this body. Diversity 
of formulas proposed both by various reports and by States illustrates the difficulty of making this necessity a 
reality. 
3.1.1 Diversity of approaches proposed by various reports on Security Council reform 
Since representativeness is at the base of legitimacy, almost all votes are in favour of enlarging the Council. Since 
the 1980s, many reform projects have been launched to enlarge the Security Council into two components 
composing it: permanent members with veto power and non-permanent members. Reports submitted by working 
groups require a chronological breakdown that makes it possible to consider proposals made first during the 1990s, 
which were characterised by a kind of renewal of the Council following the end of the Cold War and then those 
following 11 September 2001 attacks. 
The first proposals for an improved composition of this body actually emerged during the 1990s. This was 
first the case with reports of two groups of independent experts, one funded by Ford Foundation and another by 
the Commission on Global Governance (A/50/79 and S/1995/106, 6 February 1995). The first recommends 
Security Council enlargements to 23 members, including no more than five new permanent members. In addition, 
it was recommended that the veto right shall only be limited to United Nations peacekeeping issues and peace 
enforcement operations. The second, for its part, recommends the Council’s enlargement to 5 new standing 
members without veto power in a first step, while the number of non-permanent members would increase from 10 
to 13. As for the voting procedure for obtaining a decision from the Council, it is suggested that the number of 
votes required shall be increased from 9 to 14 of the non-permanent members (A. Legault, 1996). But these reports, 
like most of those that follow, have been working on composing again the Council without necessarily addressing 
the eligibility criteria for each other or the guarantees of the Council's effectiveness. The creation by the General 
Assembly of a working group specifically dedicated to reflect on the Council’s enlargement has made it possible 
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to consider an alternative approach. 
The issue related to Security Council’s equitable representation, which has been included as item on the 
General Assembly’s agenda on several occasions, has made considerable progress with creation by this plenary 
body of a working group entirely devoted to Security Council reform. This group effectively began its work in 
1994 and proposed to address the issue related to Security Council's enlargement over time. This group becomes 
"the main - but not the only - receiver of Security Council’s reform proposals. It allows States to organize 
themselves in terms of pressure groups, influence groups, proposals" (Alexandra Novosseloff, 2015). A working 
group open to all Member States of the Organization, it produced the "Razali Plan" in 1997, which advocated the 
expansion of the Council's membership. 
The Working Group had proposed in its report to increase the membership of this body from 15 to 24 members 
(General Assembly draft resolution A/ACg.247/1997/CRP.1, 20 March 1997). In A/51/47 (8 August 1997). Thus, 
five new members would be granted permanent status and four members would be non-permanent. This report has 
the merit of having substantially considered proposals for improving the composition of the Council. As such, it 
constitutes the basis on which all the schemes subsequently proposed were based in response to failure to complete 
these proposals (See, A/50/47/Rev. 1, 31 January 1997, §36, p. 10; A/51/47, 8 August 1997, § 10, p. 4; A/52/47, 
24 August 1998, § 24, p. 7; A/53/47, 5 August 1999, § 28, p. 7; A/54/47, 5 July 2000, § 31, p. 5). 
Former UN Secretary-General K. Annan had assigned a working group of international experts to reflect on 
the security challenges posed by the events of the early 21st century. This Panel of Eminent Persons issued a report 
on 2 December 2004 in which it made proposals for a more effective organization of the United Nations (A/59/565 
of 2 December 2004,"A more secure world: our shared responsibility"). 
This panel proposes an increase of 9 additional members, i.e. a Council of 24 members. Two options were 
adopted and subsequently included in the Secretary-General's report (A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005,"In larger 
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all"). In absence of a consensus on a single formula, 
those reports have proposed two options for States to reform the Security Council: A and B. New members would 
be added to the current 15 members of the Council: some of them could be permanent or semi-permanent members, 
but would not have the right of veto. Under formula A, six permanent seats with no veto power and three new non-
permanent seats with a two-year mandate would be created. Formula B, on the other hand, involves creation not 
of new permanent seats, but of a new category of seats with a four-year renewable term: there would be eight, plus 
a new seat with a two-year non-renewable term. This is similar to the current configuration of this organ (Paul 
Tavernier, 2005). Both formulas separate the problem of permanence from that of the right of veto. With regard 
to these proposals, it can be seen that they have a certain relationship with the Razali plan. This diversity of 
approaches is also perceptible in all proposals made by States. 
3.1.2 Heterogeneity of proposals made by States 
Consensus of States on the need to reform the Security Council is a structure that has evolved over time. Thus, 
some States which were formally opposed to it eventually changed their minds and proposed an increase in both 
permanent and non-permanent members. This was the case in particular for Italy, Mexico and Turkey (A/51/47, 8 
August 1997, § 2 and 6, pp. 64 and 67; A/49/965, 15 September 1995, pp. 94 and 112). In view of the flourishing 
positions of States taken individually or in groups (A/49/965, §7, p. 67; A/51/47 §5, p. 12), it seems difficult or 
even illusory to make a full inventory here. Only those made in groups will be analysed in this context. These 
include the G-4, a major group called Uniting for Consensus (UFC) and the African Union's position. 
Led by main candidates for permanent membership (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan and India), the G-4 is 
considered to be the most structured and determined group. This group is clearly leader as far as Security Council’s 
enlargement is concerned (Alexandra Novosseloff, 2006). It opts for an increase of 10 additional members, 
including six new permanent seats without veto power for at least 15 years and four non-permanent seats 
(A/59/L.64). In addition, G-4 mentioned that new members should not use a veto right until the issue of extending 
the veto to new members is decided as part of a review. Thus, aware of the difficulty in getting a proposal to 
increase the number of permanent members with veto power accepted, the Group of 4 believes that it would already 
be an achievement and a great step forward to simply become a permanent member. This single presence can be 
the beginning of conciliation between their significant contribution to United Nations activities and their relative 
participation in major decisions that engage the international community. 
Like the "G4", the African Union has made a proposal in favour of enlarging the Security Council. One of 
the main features of this approach is that this is the work of a regional organization that therefore acts on behalf of 
the whole region and has a common position. Thus, on 7 and 8 March 2005, Member States of the African Union 
adopted a common position on United Nations reform, known as the "Ezulwini Consensus". It provides that full 
representation of Africa to the Security Council means at least two permanent seats with all privileges and 
prerogatives of permanent members, including the veto right; five non-permanent seats. In general, the African 
Union proposes a reformed Security Council of 26 members, that is, an increase of 11 members. 
Following the "G 4" and the African Group position, "United for Consensus" group is a counter-proposal to 
the "G 4". Known in English as Uniting for Consensus (UFC), this group includes countries such as Canada, 
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Pakistan, Italy, Spain, South Korea, Argentina and Turkey. It stands out from the G-4 on the issue of new member 
category. Indeed, this group only proposes the addition of non-permanent members to the Security Council. These 
countries also proposed an enlarged Council of 25 members, but with a doubling of non- permanent seats from 10 
to 20. This lack of consensus on a formula also appears among the permanent members of the board. 
France and the United Kingdom have almost identical positions on Security Council reform. They formally 
support an expansion of the Council in order to increase its representativeness, but to a limited extent, in order to 
preserve its effectiveness. Of all the proposals put forward on this reform, France and the United Kingdom are in 
favour of expanding the Council in both categories of membership: permanent and non-permanent. They support 
the G-4 and an African representation for new permanent seats on the Council that advocates an expansion to 
twenty-five members for both categories. Due to difficulties in reaching an agreement at United Nations, the 
Franco-British position has changed somewhat (on the occasion of the 30th Franco-British Summit in March 2010). 
On the other hand, the positions of the United States and Russia seem less flexible and less accommodating. 
First, Russia states that the Council must remain compact and supports an enlargement limited to about 20 
seats. About the veto issue, Russia does not want any changes at this time. At the 68th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, they stated that the country was in favour of changes that would make the Council more 
representative without compromising its efficiency, productivity and speed of decision-making. For the United 
States, which had long been shy on the subject, the country has broken its silence to formulate a modest reform 
proposal. They advocate a comprehensive reform of the UN system and less a restrictive approach that only focuses 
on improving legitimacy of the Security Council. For China, developed countries are over-represented at the 
Security Council and therefore new ones should not be admitted as permanent members.  In order to preserve its 
regional leadership, China is therefore against Japan or India joining the Security Council as permanent members, 
as it considers that Asia is already represented enough in this body. Thus, only the entry of developing countries 
into the Security Council can make this body more credible and representative. 
Diversity of States' positions and proposals for Council reform reflect the complexity of the reform field. This 
goes beyond the aspect of numerical composition and the identity of new members to include the highly 
controversial issue of whether or not to grant veto power to permanent members. 
 
3.2 Ambiguity of various positions on the future of veto power in case of Security Council reform 
Veto is continuously considered anachronistic, undemocratic and above all to principle of sovereign equality of 
States on which the World Organization is based. The current geopolitical situation would no longer justify 
recognition of such a right for some States. But after more than 20 years of work, including about 10 rounds of 
intergovernmental negotiations and General Assembly debates on Security Council reform, a "comprehensive and 
reasonably timed" draft is still not on the agenda (Abdelwahab Biad, 2015). This reality is fundamentally due to 
incompatibility of various proposals involved. These are improbable removal of veto right and improbable 
"success" of formulas without veto right. 
3.2.1 Finding that veto right is unlikely to be abolished 
Security Council reform focuses all attention on the need to adapt UN structures. As such, it is mainly the 
prerogative of veto right which is the most problematic. For N. Andersson, "this right does not serve equality 
between large and small nations nor protect peoples from the scourge of war, as proven, but serves geopolitical 
interests of holders. This is an illegitimate right that must be abolished, another balance of power in the world 
would make it possible to consider it" (N. Andersson, 2015). This apprehension of veto right raises questions about 
its relevance in a democratic international system where the five permanent members no longer represent realities 
of the world on their own. Thus, some States and even some authors (Mr. Zambelli, 2005) have considered the 
possibility of abolishing the veto right as part of improving Security Council representativeness. For the large 
majority of States, veto right can be the antithesis of equality principle and democratization of UN bodies (P. 
Tavernier, 2005). This controversy surrounding the use of the veto right raises the question of its abolition, which 
ultimately seems impracticable and illusory. 
Indeed, there is a kind of consensus concerning the near impossibility of removing this privilege inherent in 
the Charter.  This is implicitly affirmed by High-level Personalities Report when it emphasizes that "we do not see 
any practical way to change the power that the veto right confers to that hold it" (A/59/565, § 256). Those in favour 
of removing veto right have been strongly opposed by the refusal of permanent members to waive this privilege 
that defines them. Rejection of the veto right seems inconceivable since it would require a State to renounce a right 
that is crucial in terms of international recognition and protection of its interests, as demonstrated by the use made 
of it. 
In response to States that have consistently argued for the removal or limitation of the veto, members have 
repeatedly expressed the view that Security Council reform should not change the status of the current permanent 
members. Thus, none of the five permanent members wishes to relinquish their seats. This permanent reluctance 
of veto holders to waive them puts affirmation A into perspective. Novosseloff according to which the real added 
value of a permanent seat on the Security Council is permanence, much less the right of (Alexandra Novosseloff, 
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2006). Indeed, if permanence alone guaranteed the same prerogatives to the current permanent members as the 
veto right offers them, they would not be so opposed to its rejection. It appears that if members are willing to make 
concessions to improve representativeness of the Security Council, they exclude the possibility of abandoning the 
veto. But beyond the refusal of the "P 5", it raises some questions about its scope. Indeed, there is no real guarantee 
that the removal of the veto right would be more beneficial to the legitimacy of the Security Council than 
maintaining it. 
The question of vacating the veto therefore seems very hypothetical in the sense that, in case this is accepted, 
it could make the Security Council even more ineffective than it is today. Indeed, lacking resources of any kind 
(military, financial, etc.), the Council depends on States and in particular; the major powers for the implementation 
of measures it decides. As such, it is unlikely that permanent members will commit themselves to implementing 
decisions to which they have not consented. This is therefore ultimately an improbable and risky (E. Pomes, 2017) 
or even unrealistic possibility. Thus, in a realistic way, H. Védrine concludes that "it is obviously a waste of time 
to advocate the end of permanent membership or veto right " (H. Védrine, 2004). Therefore, the question of 
maintaining and current modalities of veto does not seem to arise. Only the extension of the latter to possible new 
permanent members is negotiable. This observation can also be extended to proposals for enlargement of the 
Council, excluding granting this privilege to new permanent members. 
3.2.2 Improbable "success" of enlargement proposals without veto power 
Specifically, in the context Security Council enlargement, it is a matter of not granting this privilege to new 
members. Indeed, almost all various reports on this subject observed an increase in various components of the 
Security Council without veto granting (this is the case, in particular, of the Razali report). However, while they 
can be perceived as realistic, they do not incorporate fairness requirement that underlies any claim for Security 
Council reform. 
Indeed, these various proposals consolidate the regional imbalance among the permanent members of the 
Security Council. The African continent's disagreement is clear on the designation of States that may sit as 
permanent members and not on the desirability and relevance of granting such a privilege. In other words, there is 
a consensus among States on the imperative need for their presence in this "privileged club". They have also made 
this clear in a common position known as the Ezulwini Consensus, in which they provide that Africa's full 
representation on the Security Council will depend on allocation of two seats of permanent members with veto 
power and five non-permanent seats (Doc. Assembly/AU/6 (XVII), Decision on the report of Ten Heads of State 
and Government Committee on the reform of the United Nations Security Council, § 3, page 1). Thus, for Africa, 
much more than a simple numerical enlargement of the Council, the aim is to make this body more equitable by 
specifically addressing approximate representation of this continent. For A. Vallières, however, Africa no longer 
intends to be satisfied with a folding seat in the theatre of universal decisions (A. Vallières, 2006). 
The possible extension of only non-permanent members of the Council while maintaining existing veto rights 
is largely caricatured by doctrine in order to highlight its illusory nature. Thus, for Mr. Zambelli, one could say 
that this approach consists in wanting to treat a patient suffering from a serious illness with cough syrup (M. 
Zambelli, 2005). In the same vein, P. Dougbo Abel states that granting "a permanent seat without this veto power 
prerogative is the same as giving a weapon without ammunition" (P. Dougbo Abel 2014). Similarly, criticizing 
the working group's proposal for the creation of permanent seats at the Council without veto power, Zimbabwe's 
Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge said that "a permanent member without veto power will be an ox, not a bull, at 
the Security Council level". Thus, this flowering of caricatures on a proposal to expand the Security Council 
without veto power tends to demonstrate its relatively implausible and difficult to accept character. Moreover, 
continuing to strengthen the current position of the permanent members’ means "maintaining the status quo at all 
costs, ignoring radical changes in the state of the world and, as a result, exposing the Council to greater mistrust, 
mistrust and criticism". At this stage of negotiations, such a possibility seems unlikely, mainly for reasons of equity. 
All these various improbabilities have led States and other reports on law reform to consider its framework more 
carefully. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Formally envisaged and organized by the Charter, the Security Council reform is part of this pre-established legal 
framework. The analysis revealed the ambivalent nature of this normative mechanism, which finally vacillates 
between a kind of permeability and procedural rigidity. Moreover, the complexity of such an operation, 
materialized by the absence of a formal agreement, underscores the fundamentally political nature of this body 
and difficulties it poses for a follower of formalism. It also appears that this is an inseparable factor from any 
analysis of any aspect of the Security Council. 
Thus, beyond objectively legal considerations, it is mainly political considerations that regulate the outcome 
of this project, which has paradoxically become both ancestral and of constant relevance. Such a reality cannot 
ipso facto be synonymous to impossible achievement of this. Indeed, it should not be related to the myth of 
Sisyphus. It remains, although it depends on the will of the Member States, it is not necessarily impossible to meet 
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despite conciliation difficulties that it may raise, as attested by proposals multiplication made to this end (Maurice 
Kamto, 2004). 
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